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INTRODUCTION
Bill F. Chamberlin*
Writers have used the term "Information Age" to mean so many
things that it is difficult to know what the phrase means at any one
time. Most of us now understand that the flow of information is a
significant part of our lives. And likewise, most of us base our significant decisions on data collected by someone else.
Quietly, but not surprisingly, the regulation of information flow
has become an increasingly important part of the law. In fact, much
of the law directly pertaining to information flow has developed since
World War I. Congress adopted the first statute regulating the electronic media in 1927. At about the same time, the Supreme Court
interpreted the fourteenth amendment as restricting abridgement of
freedom of expression by the states. Indeed, significant portions of
the statutory and case law governing the media today have been
adopted or decided since 1960. Two examples are the 1964 Supreme
Court opinion, New York Times v. Sullivan, constitutionalizing the
law of libel; and laws adopted largely since 1965 requiring that governments provide public access to official documents.
Currently, public officials are desperately racing to keep abreast
of the economic, political, and social implications of the dynamic nature
of communications. In particular, the merger of computer technology
with improved electronic signal carriage has raised new questions
concerning access to the media, access to government information,
the protection of reputation, the protection of individual privacy, the
ability of the courts to insure a fair trial, as well as a plethora of
other issues. Our society is also being forced to address new questions
about how it ought to regulate the flow of information through new
and old communications media. Policymakers plead for more information and scholarship to help them make better informed decisions, a
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plea met in part by this issue of the University of Florida Journal
of Law and Public Policy. I am pleased that the Journal has recognized that the rapid developments in media law merit the attention
of scholars, and that the articles in this media-theme issue try to assist
decision-makers in understanding, and adjusting for, the developments
which lie ahead.
I.

YOUM

In the lead article, Kyo Ho Youm warns readers about the implications of a federal appellate court decision limiting the protection for
news media republishing foreign government reports and proceedings.
In 1985, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
held that a news organization was not protected from a successful
libel suit when it accurately reported a false South Korean government
press release. In doing so, the court refused to extend the frequently
relied upon libel defense that allows the news media to republish
official government proceedings as long as the news stories are fair,
accurate, attributed, and published without malice.
Youm reports that in a groundbreaking decision, the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals found that the reputational interests of individuals
outweigh the public interest in republishing reports of foreign governments which are not necessarily "open, reliable, or accountable." Youm
notes that the Fourth Circuit's decision places a substantial burden
on the press to check the accuracy of foreign government pronouncements, and therefore threatens to limit the information about foreign
affairs available to American citizens. Youm also notes that an ironic
impact of the decision may be that the British courts, which are often
much less sensitive to free expression, will likely protect news reports
based on foreign government proceedings more than American courts.
II.

IBN

COMPANION ARTICLES: MEYERSON AND BOTEIN

In separate articles, Michael Meyerson and Michael Botein suggest
regulatory schemes for IBNs, the fiber optic communication networks
of the future. The acronym IBN stands for integrated broadband network, a two-way communications system made of glass fiber. This
fiber technology permits the simultaneous distribution of several
thousand television channels, as well as providing the public telephone
net and several new services such as picture telephony, high-speed
videotex and video-conferencing.
Meyerson explicitly argues that the United States should plan in
advance for the regulation of IBNs. However, in the past, American
policy makers have shunned such an approach when faced with new
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communications technologies. U.S. legislators tend to let the marketplace drive the nature and functions of new communications media,
preferring the energy and creativeness of private enterprise to the
potentially inhibiting coordination of government. Such approaches
may be found embodied in the 1927 Radio Act, which merely codified
principles previously established for radio, as well as the 1984 Cable
Act, which essentially reflected a regulatory model already in place.
Although IBNs may not be economically viable until well into the next
century, Meyerson contends that anticipating their arrival will enhance
business planning and avoid unnecessary legal battles.
Botein not only anticipates the need for regulation of IBNs, but
argues that IBNs should be regulated as common carriers, which are
communications systems that are required to carry the message of
any paying customer such as telephone companies. In contrast to newspapers which exercise complete editorial autonomy, common carriers
cannot interfere with the contents of the messages they distribute.
Further, common carriers are subject to financial controls, such as
the regulation of the rates they charge, while economic regulation of
newspapers must meet first amendment scrutiny.
Botein argues that regulating IBNs as common carriers would be
particularly appropriate if IBNs are deemed natural monopolies;
businesses without competition because of special economic characteristics. Botein suggests that IBNs may be natural monopolies due
to the high start-up costs for the equipment required to operate the
network. Botein also notes that it is likely that IBNs will be owned
by natural monopolies such as local telephone companies, and that
they should therefore be subject to common carriage regulation.
Botein suggests that treating IBNs as common carriers would be
attractive for at least two reasons. Regulating IBNs as common carriers would both eliminate questions of government program regulation
and prohibit IBN operators from censoring or obstructing program
competitors. Botein warns, however, that even if IBNs are regulated
as common carriers, IBNs could still engage in anti-competitive practices. If IBNs are regulated as common carriers, Botein contends,
rates should be controlled but under a flexible scheme that would
allow for growth and development. This would insure that video programmers would be guaranteed access to IBNs at non-discriminatory
prices.
Botein also argues that if IBNs carry video, then cable and broadcast companies should be barred from owning them. Botein suggests
that since IBNs might compete with cable and broadcast companies for
the delivery of video services, the existing television businesses may
try to kill or control IBNs and then try to discriminate against other
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video providers. Cable, Botein states, has already successfully restricted cable-owned programming from other potentially competitive
media, and would probably attempt to keep similar programming from
IBNs. Botein suggests that telephone company ownership would not
present the same threat to competition since telephone companies
have had little experience in marketing video services and therefore
would have little incentive to try to exclude companies already providing video programming.
Like Botein, Meyerson believes any regulation of IBNs should
prohibit anti-competitive behavior and require IBNs to serve all customers without discrimination. Meyerson argues that IBN operators
should be barred from censoring the content carried over their network. If this were the case, IBNs should be protected from liability
for delivering the messages of others. Indeed, Meyerson appears to
advocate common carrier regulation for the IBNs, except that he
implies that IBN operators could carry their own programming as
well as the programming provided by others.
The one content control Meyerson appears ready to tolerate is a
ban on the use of IBNs to disseminate obscenity. However, Meyerson
would not use current cable and common carrier law as a model for
regulating indecency on IBNs. Instead, Meyerson proposes two kinds
of legislation to protect the integrity of IBN services.
First, since the two-way communication capabilities of IBN create
infinite possibilities for mischievous hackers, Meyerson contends that
criminal penalties for interfering with IBN information flow should be
enacted before IBNs become fully functionable. Secondly, Meyerson
argues that access to personal information disseminated on IBNs
should not be routinely available to either government or private
businesses. Information transmitted through an IBN should only be
released to the government, and then only if officials can show a
compelling need for the information.
As Botein points out, media do not evolve predictably and therefore
regulatory suggestions for future technologies are hazardous. Botein
and Meyerson both optimistically imply that the nation's policy makers
have the ability and foresight to adopt a well-considered regulatory
scheme before major corporations dominate IBNs and limit regulatory
options. The industries with vested interests will be sure that their
views are heard during the early debates over the regulation of new
technologies. The expertise of academics such as Botein and Meyerson
who can consider regulatory schemes in light of the nation's broad
social, political, and economic goals, gives hope that IBNs will be
subject to purposeful regulation rather than regulation by default.
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III.

SPLICHAL

Sigman L. Splichal, in an article that has gained importance because
of the CNN fight to broadcast tape-recorded conversations of General
Manuel Noriega and his attorneys, focuses on the conflict between
the press and the judiciary which occurs when a judge orders the
media not to print or broadcast information which the media already
possesses. Although a court order not to print or broadcast is a prior
restraint, and is ordinarily regarded as unconstitutional, appellate
courts have traditionally permitted judges to sanction the media for
printing or broadcasting material in defiance of a court order. In fact,
appellate courts have gone as far as upholding contempt citations
levied against the media even when the original court order was
deemed to have been an unconstitutional prior restraint. Early in
1991, a federal district court judge was still considering the possibility
of citing CNN for contempt of court for broadcasting the Noriega
tapes contrary to a court order.
Splichal's article focuses on a 1987 case from the First Circuit
Court of Appeals, United States v. Providence Journal, that reached
a result at odds with a long-relied upon case from the Fifth Circuit,
United States v. Dickinson. In Dickinson, the Fifth Circuit rejected
an appeal of contempt charges after reporters disobeyed a judge's
order not to publish information from an open court hearing. In Providence Journal, the Fifth Circuit held that a newspaper could defy
a transparently unconstitutional prior restraint order and not subsequently be held in contempt as long as timely access to an appellate
court was not available. Although the United States Supreme Court
originally granted certiorari in Providence Journal,it eventually dismissed the case on the grounds that the case had not been properly
presented to the Court.
Splichal argues that the Supreme Court's failure to consider the
issues raised in Providence Journal leaves journalists in a quandary
when faced with a court-ordered prior restraint. Splichal contends
that if journalists decide to obey such a court order, the value of the
information to the public could be diminished or destroyed. However,
if the journalists choose to deny the order, editors and reporters put
themselves at serious risk of being held in contempt in most jurisdictions. Splichal argues that the Supreme Court could help resolve the
difficult problems that arise when judicial power confronts press freedom if the Court would articulate standards for courts to use when
faced with requests for restraining orders on speech. He argues that
the Court could mandate procedural safeguards, including rapid review
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of the restraint of news. In addition, Splichal notes that the Court
needs to provide a practical definition of a transparently invalid prior
restraint order that can be ignored without subsequent risk.
IV.

PERRY

In her article, Linda Perry thoroughly explores the United States
Supreme Court's 1989 decision overturning the conviction of a Florida
newspaper for printing the name of a rape victim. In FloridaStar v.
B.J.F., the Court held that a state may not automatically impose civil
or criminal sanctions on a newspaper for publishing lawfully obtained,
truthful information found in government records. Perry says the
balancing test used by the Court in FloridaStar extends the constitutional protection for the publication of personal information that individuals may not want published and restricts the permissible scope of
nondisclosure statutes and tort law. After FloridaStar, Perry reports,
the media can be prosecuted for printing or broadcasting truthful
information about individuals only if officials can demonstrate a governmental interest of "the highest order," demonstrate that the punishment would achieve that governmental interest, and show that the
punishment is narrowly tailored and the "least drastic" means available
to accomplish the governmental purpose.
Perry says Florida Star raises, without answering, the question
of whether truthful publication could ever be subject to either civil
or criminal liability for a violation of privacy. Perry points out that
the majority opinion in Florida Star noted that the Court has never
before upheld the right of personal privacy when that right conflicts
with the first amendment right to publish. Perry notes that under
this test, tort liability depends on a case-by-case review of the facts.
In FloridaStar, the Court at least prohibited state punishment of
the press without a minimal showing of negligence. The Court also
said the first amendment protects any lawfully obtained information
the government releases into the public domain. In addition, laws
cannot punish the media for publishing information that can legally
be disseminated by other means, such as gossip. Perry says the Court
held that privacy must be protected in other ways, such as denying
the public access to the information or punishing government officials
for releasing it.
Perry notes that requiring the government to take responsibility
for protecting information in its custody may actually chill the release
of information to the press. Perry contends that an attempt to hold
officials accountable for the release of personal records may cause
records custodians to be more reluctant than they already are to
provide reporters with documents that members of the public are
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legally entitled to obtain. She also notes that the Supreme Court itself,
only months before FloridaStar, upheld a denial of access to information on an individual's computerized criminal rap sheet when that
information was publicly available in paper records in various law
enforcement offices.
Readers will also want to examine the Case Comment section of
the Journal, which provides students with an opportunity to publish
commentary on recent cases of general interest. The student members
of the Journalstaff compete in order to have their research published.
The work of the students helps prepare them for the rigors of solid
research, good communications skills, and strong argumentation demanded in the legal profession.
Finally, I want to congratulate the editors of the Journal of Law
and Public Policy for successfully publishing their third issue. Only
those persons who have tried to edit a publication know that a journal
can be a demanding taskmaster. The students have been rewarded
with increased knowledge and the discipline of editing highly technical
material. The academic community and legal profession are rewarded
by useful contributions to the debate of the public policy issues included
in this publication.

